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Britain’s Religious Tribunals: ‘Joint Governance’ in Practice+ 
Russell Sandberg*, Gillian Douglas**, Norman Doe***, Sophie Gilliat-Ray**** and Asma Khan***** 
 
Abstract - In recent years, there have been a number of moral panics in Western societies 
about the existence of religious courts and tribunals in general and Shariah law in 
particular.  In England and Wales, these concerns came to the fore following the Archbishop 
of Canterbury’s 2008 lecture on ‘Civil Law and Religious Law in England’.  In that lecture, 
the Archbishop drew upon the work of the Canadian scholar Ayelet Shachar endorsing her 
concept of ‘transformative accommodation’. In this article, we return to the work of Shachar 
in the light of our recent empirical study which examined the divorce jurisdiction of three 
religious tribunals in detail: a Jewish Beth Din; a matrimonial tribunal of the Roman 
Catholic Church; and a Muslim Shariah Council.  We suggest that the focus upon Shachar’s 
concept of ‘transformative accommodation’ by the Archbishop and subsequent commentators 
is unfortunate given that Shachar actually proposes ‘transformative accommodation’ as just 
one variant of what she refers to as ‘joint governance’ (albeit her preferred variant). We 
propose that the umbrella concept of ‘joint governance’ and its other variants can be 
developed in a way that could prove to be more useful than ‘transformative accommodation’.  
Keywords: authority, constitutional theory, courts,  multiculturalism.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Religious tribunals have operated in Britain for centuries.1  The Church Courts were the 
earliest courts that looked like courts of law.2   And even today, although their jurisdiction is 
now much trimmed,3 the modern ecclesiastical courts of the Church of England remain part 
of the English legal system;4 their decisions are subject to judicial review by the High Court.5 
Moreover, leaving to one side the constitutional peculiarities of the established church,6 the 
English legal system has long accepted and administered multiple forms and sources of law. 
Historically, an equitable jurisdiction grew alongside the common law and today a single 
coherent hierarchy of sources exist whereby legal norms originating from the European 
Union, international human rights instruments and devolved institutions are included 
alongside the decisions of the common law courts and legislation enacted at Westminster.   
Yet, in the shadows of 9/11,7 the existence of religious legal systems has proved 
contentious.   A number of Western societies have seen heated debates about the extent to 
which religious legal systems are, and should be, accommodated within the national legal 
systems, and, in most cases, these debates have become debased into moral panics 
characterised by a fear of Shariah.8  In Canada in 2004 a report authored by the former 
                                                 
1
 We recognise that the terms ‘religious tribunal’ and ‘religious court’ are useful (but limited) labels to describe 
similar structures which have been set up by faith communities. We use the term ‘court’ or ‘tribunal’ in the 
functional senses identified by Roger Cotterrell, as going beyond ‘dispute resolution’ to embrace administrative 
processing and enforcement of norms through the application and development of legal doctrine: R Cotterrell, 
The Sociology of Law (Oxford University Press 1992) 208. 
2
 S F C Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (2nd edn.  Butterworths, 1981) 25. A single judge 
considered and compared the evidence of witnesses and applied the rules of law to the facts.   The rules of law 
could even be looked up in books. 
3
 See R B Outhwaite, The Rise and Fall of the Ecclesiastical Courts, 1500-1860 (Cambridge University Press, 
2006). 
4
 N Doe, The Legal Framework of the Church of England: A Critical Study in a Comparative Context  
(Clarendon Press, 1996) chapter 5 and M Hill, Ecclesiastical Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2007) 
chapters 6 and 7.  
5
 Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963, s81. See M Hill, ‘Judicial Review of Ecclesiastical Courts’ in N Doe, 
M Hill and R Ombres (eds) English Canon Law (University of Wales Press 1998) 104. 
6
 See R Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press 2011) chapter 4. 
7
 According to Bharma, it is vital that we bear in mind that we are all ‘post-colonial and post-9/11 people’: M K 
Bharma, The Challenges of Justice in Diverse Societies (Ashgate 2011) 112, 114. 
8
 This spelling of the word ‘Shariah’ is used throughout this article since it is the spelling adopted by the Muslim 
Shariah Council we studied.  
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Attorney General, Marion Boyd, stating that the ‘Arbitration Act [1991] should continue to 
allow disputes to be arbitrated using religious law’,9  led to riots in major Canadian cities and 
a statement by the Premier of Ontario, Dalton McGuinty, that, ‘There will be no shariah law 
in Ontario. There will be no religious arbitration in Ontario. There will be one law for all 
Ontarians’.10  And in London in 2008, a lecture by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan 
Williams, in which he suggested that ‘we have to think a little harder about the role and rule 
of law in a plural society of overlapping identities’ caused uproar.11 
These two moral panics –concerning the existing accommodation of religious legal 
systems – point to a need to understand both the extent to which religious legal systems are 
already accommodated by the State’s legal system and the extent to which they could be so 
accommodated.  A leading work in this debate, cited by the Archbishop in his lecture, is 
Ayelet Shachar’s book Multicultural Jurisdictions.12 Many commentators have followed the 
Archbishop in promoting Shachar’s concept of ‘transformative accommodation’.13 However, 
most of the time transformative accommodation is simply referenced: 14  few commentators 
have recognised that Shachar herself was advocating ‘transformative accommodation’ as one 
                                                 
9
 M Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion (Ministry of the Attorney 
General, 2004).    
10
 L E Weinrib, ‘Ontario’s Sharia Law Debate: Law and Politics under the Charter’ in R Moon (ed) Law and 
Religious Pluralism in Canada (UCB Press 2008) 239 at 250. 
11
 R Williams, ‘Civil and Religious Law in England – A Religious Perspective’ (2008) 10 Ecclesiastical Law 
Journal 262. For an analysis of the media reaction to the Archbishop’s lecture, see chapter 7 of N A Kabir, 
Young British Muslims (Edinburgh University Press 2010).  
12
 A Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights (Cambridge University 
Press 2001). 
13
 The Archbishop defined ‘transformative accommodation’ as ‘a scheme in which individuals retain the liberty 
to choose the jurisdiction under which they will seek to resolve certain carefully specified matters' : Williams,  
(n 11) 274.  
14
 See, e.g., A Bradney, Law and Faith in a Sceptical Age (Routledge-Cavendish 2009) 51-52 and B Jackson, 
‘“Transformative Accommodation” and Religious Law’ (2009) 11 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 131-153.  
Although a recent report funded by the British Academy cites the work of Shachar as part of its discussion of 
possible State responses to minority legal orders, the report refers only to transformative accommodation: M 
Malik, Minority Legal Orders in the UK (The British Academy, 2012) 36. In contrast to legal studies, some 
works in political science do engage with Shachar’s wider arguments they do not do so from an empirical 
perspective. See, e.g., the essays collected in A Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev (eds), Minorities within 
Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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form of what she refers to as ‘joint governance’. Although ‘transformative accommodation’ 
is Shachar’s preferred form of joint governance, it is not the only form.  
This article seeks to discuss the arguments and the various forms of joint governance put 
forward by Shachar in light of the findings of a recent multidisciplinary research project 
which sought to collect information on the role and practice of religious tribunals in England 
and Wales.15   Unlike previous studies which have focused upon only one religious 
tradition,16 our project examined the workings of three religious tribunals in detail: 17  the 
Catholic National Tribunal for Wales, the London Beth Din and the Shariah Council of the 
Birmingham Central Mosque.18  This article uses this understanding of how these tribunals 
operate in practice in order to re-assess Shachar’s theoretical arguments.  We suggest that, 
although this juxtaposition provides support for Shachar’s call for ‘joint governance’, 
transformative accommodation is less helpful than the other variants of joint governance that 
she proposed.  Moreover, our empirical findings underscore several weaknesses inherent in 
Shachar’s argument that need to be addressed.   
 
2. THE FOUNDATIONS OF JOINT GOVERNANCE  
Shachar’s work, like our research project, begins from a legal pluralist perspective. Although, 
ironically, a plurality of ideas about legal pluralism can be said to exist,19 for our purposes 
                                                 
15
 For further discussion of our methodology and findings see G Douglas et al, ‘Marriage and Divorce in 
Religious Courts:  A Case Study’ (2011) 41 Family Law 956-961 and G Douglas et al, ‘The Role of Religious 
Tribunals in Regulating Marriage and Divorce’ (2012) 24 (2) Child and Family Law Quarterly 139-157. 
16
 For example, Shariah courts in particular  have been the subject of valuable studies by S Shah-Kazemi, 
Untying the Knot: Muslim Women, Divorce and the Shariah (Nuffield Foundation 2001) and S Bano, ‘Islamic 
Family Arbitration, Justice and Human Rights in Britain’, (2007) 1 Law, Social Justice & Global Development 
Journal http://www.go.warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/2007_1/bano (accessed 21 July 2011). 
17
 Our study involved in depth interviews with personnel from all three tribunals, observation of 27 Shariah 
Council hearings and analysis of two years’ worth of statistics relating to the Catholic Tribunal. 
18
  Note, however, that since our empirical investigation consisted mainly of interviews with court personnel, the 
data collected therefore is from the perspective of the court rather than of the users. 
19
 A number of different classifications exist (see Bharma (n 7) 93).  Tamanaha, for instance, draws a distinction 
between colonial legal pluralism (epitomised by M B Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and 
Neo-Colonial Laws (Clarendon Press 1975)) and the more recent scholarship characterised by the suggestion 
that ‘there are many ‘legal’ orders operative in society, of which State law is just one, and often not the most 
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Tamanaha’s understanding of legal pluralism can be adopted, that is, the acceptance that ‘it is 
normal for more than one “legal” system to co-exist in the same social arena’.20  It requires 
the acceptance of what Eugen Ehrlich famously referred to as ‘living law’,  the existence of 
rules ‘based on social behaviour rather than the compulsive norms of the state’, which are 
generated by formal and informal social groupings or ‘social associations’.21   Shachar 
follows Cover’s use of the Greek term ‘nomos’,22 to refer to minority communities that 
generate sets of group-sanctioned norms of behavior that differ from those encoded in state 
law’.23  
Our empirical research shows how a number of religiously-based nomoi groups exist 
in twenty-first century Britain.  Our study focused on the matrimonial jurisdiction of three 
such tribunals, namely: the Family Division of the Jewish London Beth Din, which is part of 
the United Synagogue, dealing with questions concerning Jewish status, conversion, divorce 
and arbitration; 24 the Shariah Council of the Birmingham Central Mosque, which provides 
rulings, guidance and advice on a range of issues including matrimonial and inheritance 
issues as well as requests to learn more about Islam; and the Catholic National Tribunal for 
Wales in Cardiff, which serves as the equivalent of the ‘diocesan’ court for the three 
dioceses25 in Wales26 and exercises the judicial powers laid out in the Code of Canon Law.   
                                                                                                                                                        
powerful one’ (characterised by J Griffiths ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1): 
B Z Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (Oxford University Press 2001) 115-116.   
20
 Ibid 171.  
21
 E Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (Transaction Publishers, 2002) 39.  
22
 R M Cover, ‘The Supreme Court 1982 Term, Forward: Nomos and Narrative’ (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 
4.  
23
 She defines nomoi groups as groups of people that share a comprehensive world view which extends to 
creating a law for the community’: Shachar (n  12) 2, fn 5; citing A Greene ‘Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes 
about Equality’(1996) 96  Columbia Law Review 1, 4. The use of the term ‘law’ here has been criticised. 
Phillips argues that its use means that Shachar is restricting her focus to groups who ‘are already staking 
extensive claims’: A Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture (Princeton University Press 2007)  
19. 
24
 It is over 100 years old.  For discussion of how the Arbitration Act 1996 operates in relation to religious 
arbitrators, see Sandberg, (n 6) chapter 9.  
25
 The term ‘diocese’ refers to the territories that are subject to the jurisdiction of Bishops.  At the smallest level, 
dioceses are divided into parishes.  
26
 Wales for this purpose includes part of Herefordshire. 
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All three tribunals have been active for some time and remain busy, vibrant institutions which 
play an important role in the lives of some believers. The communities we studied embrace 
Shachar’s notion of ‘joint governance’; the people who use the tribunals ‘jointly belong to 
more than one community, and will accordingly bear rights and obligations that derive from 
more than one source of legal authority’.27 Our research confirmed that the fundamental 
rationale for the grant of the religious annulment/divorce is to declare that the religious 
marriage is over and to enable the parties to remarry within the faith. For adherents, being 
able to remarry religiously serves both to enable them to remain within their faith community 
and to regularise their position with the religious authorities. This is particularly crucial in the 
Jewish religion, because the failure to obtain a get will jeopardise the legitimate status of the 
parties’ future children and descendants.  This is underlined by the following exchange with 
one of our interviewees at the Beth Din:  
Q: Just to confirm: for a marriage that was conducted under Orthodox auspices, if 
that marriage is not then dissolved under Orthodox auspices is that tantamount to 
them losing their religion?  
 
A: It’s not losing their religion but, you see, it would mean that a subsequent 
relationship they would enter into, if they hadn’t dissolved their marriage, would be 
adultery. So a woman who had not had her marriage dissolved according to Jewish 
law who then had had a civil divorce and then went ahead and married another person 
then that would be an adulterous relationship which, whilst they decide they may not 
take that seriously, we take it very seriously from our traditional Jewish teachings and 
off-spring of such a union would be regarded as seriously handicapped in terms of 
Jewish status law. 
                                                 
27
 Shachar (n 12) 13.  
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Although the existence of religious tribunals is by no means a new phenomenon, this notion 
of belonging and deriving rights and obligations from a legal system other than the state has 
proved particularly controversial in recent years. However, as Shachar usefully points out, 
while for some secularists it is the very existence of religious tribunals that is problematic,28 
for most critics the ‘problem’ with religious tribunals is what she refers to as the ‘paradox of 
multicultural vulnerability’.29 This refers to the fear that  the ‘accommodation of different 
cultures can conflict with the protection of certain members’ citizenship rights’;30 the 
recognition of the rights and obligations that result from belonging to a nomoi group can 
paradoxically reduce the rights and obligations that a person would ordinarily enjoy by virtue 
of their citizenship.31   This may occur, for example, where the nomos of the group differs 
from that of the state as regards gender roles or sexual orientation.32   The paradox refers to 
the way in which ‘the same policy that seems attractive when evaluated from an inter-group 
perspective can systematically work to the disadvantage of certain group members from an 
intra-group perspective’.33  
While it is important not to overplay the ‘paradox of multicultural vulnerability’,34 
Shachar’s identification of the paradox allows us to recognise that those who use the religious 
tribunals are both ‘culture-bearers and rights-bearers’.35   This mandates us to attempt a more 
ambitious and realistic solution than simply concluding that we should ‘abandon any attempt 
                                                 
28
 The objection being that the tribunal poses a challenge to the law of the State: see, for instance, the ‘One Law 
for All’ campaign’. See D MacEoin, Sharia Law or ‘One Law for All? (Civitas, The Cromwell Press Group 
2009) http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/ShariaLawOrOneLawForAll.pdf (accessed 02 December 2011). 
29
 Shachar  (n 12) 3.  
30
 Ibid 4.   
31
 Ibid 3. 
32
 For a discussion of the tensions which have emerged between laws protecting religious freedom and those 
which prohibit discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, see R Sandberg,  ‘The Right to Discriminate’ 
(2011) 13 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 157. 
33
 Shachar  (n 12) 3. While inter-group equality is concerned with establishing equal treatment between cultural 
and religious intra-group inequalities is concerned with establishing equality within cultural and religious 
groups. 
34
 See Phillips for the criticism of the tendency whereby ‘principles of gender equality were being deployed as 
part of a demonization of minority cultural groups’: Phillips (n 23) 2.  
35
 A Shachar, ‘Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from Religious Arbitration in Family Law’ (2008) 9 (2) 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 573, 593.   
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to enhance the autonomy of minority cultures’.36  As Shachar argues, the paradox raises ‘a 
different and more complicated challenge’:  
We need to develop a conception of differentiated citizenship which is guided by an 
ambitiously innovative principle: one that strives for the reduction of injustice 
between groups, together with the enhancement of justice within them.37   
Shachar is, by no means alone in making these arguments. Her work explicitly draws upon a 
number of multiculturalist theorists such as Will Kymlicka,38 Charles Taylor39 and Iris 
Young40 who from the early 1990s onwards called for ‘a fresher and more nuanced 
understanding of citizenship’  under which group-based distinctiveness ‘should now be 
recognized, respected, and even nourished by the contemporary state’. 41  However, in our 
view, Shachar makes three important (and novel) contributions.  
 
A. The Multicultural Triad 
Shachar’s first contribution is to remind us that there are ‘three parties to the multicultural 
triad’.42 Although Shachar follows Kymlicka, Taylor and Young in arguing in favour of 
respecting group-based cultural differences, she makes an important step forward because:  
The earliest proponents of multiculturalism too often forget the position of the citizen-
insider, who simultaneously belongs to, and is affected by, both the group and the 
state authority. 43   
                                                 
36
 Shachar cites B Barry, Culture and Equality (Harvard University Press 2001) as an example of this approach.  
37
 Shachar (n 12) 4. Anne Phillips calls this the ‘minority within minorities’ argument because it draws attention 
to the ways that groups can oppress their own internal minorities: see Phillips (n 23) 12. 
38
 Shachar draws in particular on Kymlicka’s concept of ‘differentiated citizenship rights’: W Kymlicka, 
Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford University Press 1995) 26. Note, 
however, that in this publication at least, Kymlicka does not seek to explore institutional models.  See Susan 
Moller Okin’s famous critique of Kymlicka’s liberal theory on minority rights in S M Okin  ‘Is Multiculturalism 
Bad for Women?’ in S M Okin et al. (eds.) Is Multiculturalism  Bad for Women? (Princeton University Press 
1999), 7.   
39
 See, in particular, his ground-breaking essay, C Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in A Guttmann (ed) 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton University Press, 1994) 25. 
40
 See, e.g., I Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press, 1990).  
41
 Shachar (n 12) 22, citing Taylor, (n 39), 38.  
42
 Shachar (n 12) 5.  
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There are, of course, dangers implicit in this approach.  The focus on the citizen-insider (in 
addition to the focus upon the group and the state) may be problematic if it translates into an 
acceptance of an individualism which downplays the role that affiliations and memberships 
continue to have.44  Furthermore, the focus on the citizen-insider may be disproportionate if 
attention is not also afforded to citizens of the state who are not members of a nomoi group.45  
However, although these risks should not be dismissed lightly, it is important to note that 
Shachar is saying that the citizen-insider should be part of the focus; she is not saying that it 
should be the sole focus. Moreover, such a focus follows from the identification of the 
paradox of multicultural vulnerability: this paradox cannot be solved without considering the 
agency of those within nomoi groups.  As Phillips forcefully points out, reference to minority 
cultures is now ‘widely employed in a discourse that denies human agency’.46  It is not 
simply the case of understanding how the citizen-insider is affected by their joint membership 
of the group and the state, we need also to understand the actions, desires and intentions of 
citizen-insiders themselves. This was highlighted in our empirical study. All three tribunals 
stressed their voluntary nature: as one of our interviewees at the Shariah Council put it, 
‘ultimately the decision is theirs’.  One interviewee at the Beth Din stated that ‘it’s 
consensual for our clients coming here’ and added:  
I think we’re concerned not to discourage people from making use of our process. We 
recognise that people are citizens living in a free society. No one has to come to us in a 
sense and so we want to make our process as accessible and as least problematic as 
                                                                                                                                                        
43
 Ibid 6.  
44
 See, for instance, the work of Franck who declares that we live in an ‘age of individualism’ (T M Franck, The 
Empowered Self: Law and Society in an Age of Individualism (Oxford University Press, 1999) which is 
criticised by Bharma (n 7) 49-52. 
45
 As the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly made clear, freedom of religion constitutes not only 
‘one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life’ but ‘is 
also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned’ (emphasis added): Kokkinakis v 
Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397. 
46
 See Phillips(n 23) 9.  
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possible.   If two Jewish people who wish to end their marriage choose not to go to the 
Beth Din I can’t do anything about it and I don’t want to put obstacles in their way. 
 
B. The Nature of Multicultural Identity 
Shachar therefore seeks to recognise ‘the complex and multi-layered nature of multicultural 
identity’.47  She asserts that we cannot ‘remain blind to the web of complex and overlapping 
affiliations which exist between these competing entities’. 48  Shachar is, again, not alone in 
making this point. Taylor’s notion of the ‘politics of recognition’ is based on the 
understanding that personal identity is ‘negotiated through dialogue, partly overt, partly 
internal, with others’49 while Zigmunt Bauman has gone further to suggest  that we live in an 
age of ‘Liquid Modernity’50 where people can change their identity as and when they 
choose.51  Such sentiments are also found in the literature on cosmopolitanism,52 which is 
‘built on the multiplicities of allegiances that characterise any person’.53  However, whilst 
calls for cosmopolitanism have been criticised on the basis that the term ‘conjures up too 
much the world of the global elite, the cultural tourist’ and gives ‘too little weight to local 
attachment’, 54 this notion of identity as something which is constantly  being negotiated  
transforms the debate on the recognition of nomos.  As Phillips puts it, this understanding 
sees that people are ‘cultural beings’ rather than being ‘of a culture’.55  
                                                 
47
 Shachar (n 12) 15. 
48
 Ibid 5. This point was developed by the Archbishop in his lecture which included a call for the recognition of 
‘multiple affiliations’, by which he meant the recognition that people take ‘membership in different but 
overlapping sets of social relationship’: Williams (n 11) 269. 
49
 Taylor (n 39). 
50
 See, e.g., Z Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Polity Press 2000).  
51
 Z Bauman , ‘From Pilgrim to Tourist - Or a Short History of Identity’ in S Hall and P Du Gay (eds) Questions 
of Cultural Identity (Sage 1996) 18-36.  
52
 See, e.g., J Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative’ (1992) 25 University of Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform 751. 
53
 Phillips(n 23) 68. 
54
 Ibid 68. 
55
 Ibid 52. 
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Shachar therefore overcomes one of the criticisms which Phillips makes of the 
literature on multiculturalism: ‘the tendency to represent individuals from minority or non-
Western groups as driven by their culture and compelled by cultural dictates to behave in 
particular ways’.56  This allows an important distinction to be drawn between ‘understanding 
cultural pressures, but not assuming that culture dictates’.57 Such an approach also overcomes 
a further criticism made of the literature by Phillips, the way in which commentators ‘have 
exaggerated not only the unity and solidity of cultures but the intractability of value conflicts 
as well’.58  Shachar’s understanding of identity leads her to state that ‘a group’s established 
traditions are more fluid than we sometimes acknowledge.’ 59 This supports Ferrari’s 
description of religious law as a ‘dynamic phenomenon’ because ‘religions (and religious 
laws) are born and die every day’.60  Religious law should be understood to include both the 
rules found in sacred texts and also the more practical rules developed by religious groups 
themselves.61  This was underscored in our study of the three religious tribunals.  All three of 
the tribunals we studied were creating and negotiating rules in a flexible way. For instance,62 
although this may not be typical of Shariah Councils,63 the Shariah Council we studied did 
not claim to  represent any single school of thought and said that they based their ‘verdicts’ 
upon rulings derived from the four main schools of Sunni thought together with other sources 
from the Sunni tradition, as well as minority interpretations. As one interviewee put it, ‘if the 
                                                 
56
 Ibid 8-9. 
57
 Ibid 41 
58
 Ibid 8. 
59
 Shachar (n 12) 40. 
60
 S Ferrari, ‘Religious Law: A Discussion’ in A Huxley, (ed), Religion, Law and Tradition: Comparative 
Studies in Religious Law (Routledge, London 2002) 155. This is shown by the concept of angrezi shariat 
developed by Pearl and Menski to describe the hybrid legal systems which have evolved amongst Diasporas in 
Britain. See W Menski and D Pearl Muslim Family Law (Sweet and Maxwell, London 1998). Similar ideas 
about legal hybridity can be found in Ballard’s term of ‘Desh Pardesh’ which describes the ‘adaptive strategy’ 
and ‘skilled cultural navigation’ by South African diasporas: R Ballard, ‘Introduction: The Emergence of Desh 
Pardesh’ in R Ballard (ed) Desh Pardesh:  The South African Presence in Britain (Hurst, London 1994) 1, 4-5, 
29-31. 
61
 Sandberg (n 6) 170. 
62
 This is also true of the Beth Din, which will look to a range of opinions and rulings from other batei din in 
reaching its judgments but, as there is no hierarchy of tribunals, it is not bound by any prior ruling.   
63
 See Shah-Kazemi (n 16) and Bano (n 16). 
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parties do wish to be judged by a particular school of thought then they would realise in the 
very initial stages that they have come to the wrong place’. The interviewee was adamant 
that:  
No decision should be made in absence of reality and context which is where things 
can go wrong … if you take a decision that is in the books. We feel we cannot apply 
… just from the texts so what we do look at [it and say] this is what the Quran says, 
this is what the Hadith says64   
Even the National Tribunal, which is part of the Catholic Church’s court structure, took a 
flexible and creative approach drawing on commentaries as well as the Code of Canon Law65 
and regarding its own decisions and  rulings from Rome as persuasive but not binding.66  Our 
empirical work clearly rebutted popular understandings of religious customs and laws which 
regard such norms as simply being ancient and fixed.  
 
C. The Rejection of Binary Solutions  
Shachar’s inclusion of the citizen-insider, her focus upon human agency and her recognition 
of the dynamic nature of nomos, leads her to reject straightforward and tempting solutions to 
the ‘paradox of multicultural vulnerability’. In her view, inactivity on the part of the state 
perpetuates the paradox of multicultural vulnerability. She writes that a stance of ‘“non-
intervention” may effectively translate into immunizing wrongful behaviour by more 
                                                 
64
 One interviewee at the Shariah Council explained that this flexibility was an objective taken into account 
when recruiting personnel:  ‘I select a person who is not bound by this school of thought or that school of 
thought or that decision which have been taken by one authority, we strictly go on the basis and view our case 
on the basis of Quran and Sunna’.  For further discussion of this modern phenomenon (Takayyar) of selecting 
the most appealing and appropriate doctrine from amongst the existing Islamic schools see I Yilmaz, ‘Law as 
Chameleon:  The Question of Incorporation of Muslim Personal Law into English Law’ (2001) 21 Journal of 
Muslim Minority Affairs 297. 
65
 Most notably Dignitas Connubi which expands on the Canons, provides a fuller explanation and brings 
common procedures together. Articles found in legal journals and opinions of eminent Canonists are also 
persuasive.   
66
 However, Doe has argued that whilst theoretically there is no system of precedent in the Catholic courts, in 
practice some form of precedent system does exist: N Doe, ‘Canonical Doctrines of Judicial Precedent: A 
comparative study’ (1994) 54 The Jurist 205. 
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powerful parties’.67  Turning a ‘blind eye’ to what occurs within religious tribunals relegates 
‘these religious traditions to the margins, labelled as unofficial, exotic, or even dangerous 
(unrecognized) law’. 68  Our study underlined how this critique can be made of the way in 
which English law affords no recognition to religious divorces.69  As Shachar notes, this 
proves problematic where Muslim and Jewish women are stuck in a ‘split status’ position 
where they are ‘legally divorced according to state law, though still married according to 
their faith’; she writes that this ‘may leave these women prey to abuse by recalcitrant 
husbands who are well aware of the adverse effect this situation has on their wives, as they 
fall between the cracks of civil and religious jurisdictions’.70 The need to determine the status 
of the religious marriage was stressed by one of our interviewees at the Shariah Council: 
There have been cases where a woman was pregnant by a man she wasn’t married to, 
so we have to resolve the case … because that cannot be left to carry on like that 
because that would be living in sin. Islamically, it’s far better to be divorced than 
committing adultery and so we have to make an effort to deal with it as soon as 
possible so that she can marry him. 
Moreover, our empirical research pointed at a further related problem where religious 
marriages are not registered and consequently the parties are not married in the eyes of the 
state.  This means that should the (religious) marriage get into difficulties then those parties 
have little redress under state law. Rather than being able to use both the courts of the state 
and the tribunals of the group, such people can only have recourse to the tribunals of the 
group. Our research suggests that this is a real problem in the Muslim community.  The 
                                                 
67
 Shachar (n 35) 593.  She writes that this laissez-faire stance ‘reinforces the myth that left to their own devices, 
identity groups could exist as autonomous entities bearing little relation to the state’. This is a myth because ‘the 
“walls” of identity groups are never absolutely sealed’, nomoi groups are always reacting to the effects of state 
power, even when they claim to be most isolated from them: Shachar (n 12) 37, 40. 
68
 Shachar (n 35), 593. 
69
 For a further discussion of this point, see G Douglas et al, ‘Accommodating Religious Divorce in the Secular 
State: A Case-Study Analysis’ in M Maclean and J Eekelaar (eds) Families: Deviance, Diversity and the Law 
(Hart Publishing 2012) forthcoming.   
70
 Shachar (n 35) 576. 
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Shariah Council we studied deals with a significant number (over half in the 27 cases that we 
observed) of litigants who do not have a marriage recognised under English law.71  These 
examples underscore the dangers of a laissez-faire stance.  
This requires the rejection of the ‘unavoidable costs’ argument argued by Chandran 
Kukathas, 72  which Shachar writes claims that ‘a genuinely tolerant state will rarely intervene 
in minority group affairs - even if that minority group systemically violates certain of its 
member’s citizenship rights’.73  Such non-interference with internal group affairs is 
sometimes justified by an appeal to the ‘right to exit’ rationale which argues that the role of 
the state should be limited to ensuring that at-risk group members are able to leave if they do 
not like their group’s practices.74  Like many scholars,75 Shachar argues that this ‘right to exit 
offers no comprehensive approach at all’ because it imposes ‘the burden of solving conflict 
upon the individual’ whilst ‘relieving the state of any responsibility for the situation’:76  
The right to exit rationale forces an insider into a cruel choice of penalties: either 
accept all group practices – including those that violate your fundamental citizenship 
rights – or (somehow) leave. 77   
As Phillips puts it, the ‘right to exit’ alone is insufficient because ‘voice matters as well as 
exit. The right to leave has to be complemented by the right to stay’.78  Moreover, as Shachar 
points out, this emphasis on the ‘right to exit’ is based on the premise that individuals cannot 
                                                 
71
 Other studies had presented similar figures: see Shah-Kazemi (n 16) and Bano, (n 16). 
72
 See C Kukathas, ‘Are There Any Cultural Rights?’ (1992) 20 Political Theory 105, 133 and, in response, W 
Kymlicka, ‘The Rights of Minority Cultures: A Reply to Kukathas’ (1992) 20 Political Theory 140-146.   
73
 Shachar (n 12) 12; see also 68-70. 
74
 Shachar (n 12) 41. On which see the chapters by Reitman and Weinstock in Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev (n 
14).  
75
 Phillips, for example, denounces the ‘right to exit’ rationale as not attaching ‘enough significance to cultural 
belonging’: Phillips (n 23) 133. She writes that it is based on a ‘constructivist account of culture and universalist 
account of human nature’ (135). For a further critique of the ‘exit theory’ using applied normative legal theory 
see F Ahmed, ‘Personal Autonomy and the Option of Religious Law’ (2010) 24(2) International Journal of 
Law, Policy and the Family 222. 
76
 Shachar (n 12) 41.  As Levy points out, ‘to have a culture whose exit is entirely costless ... is to have no 
culture at all’:  J T Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear (Oxford University Press 2000) 112. 
77
 Shachar (n 12) 41. 
78
 Phillips (n 23) 157. 
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simultaneously be members of both the state and the group.79   It presumes that group 
members ‘have relinquished the set of rights and protections granted to them by virtue of 
their citizenship’.80   This is not the case; one of our interviewees at the Beth Din commented 
that they recognised that ‘people are citizens living in a free society’. Moreover:  
We are British citizens and we abide by British law and anything that’s done from a 
Jewish perspective is in addition to civil law. 
The ‘unavoidable costs’ response is therefore fundamentally flawed because it is based on an 
oversimplified “either-or”- type understanding of legal authority which is not tailored to 
respect individuals’ manifold identities’.81  Our research supports Shachar in arguing against 
such a ‘binary’ approach and demonstrating the need for a ‘new approach to multicultural 
accommodation [which] must break away from the prevailing yet misleading “either your 
culture or your rights” ultimatum that underpins existing solutions’. 82  For Shachar, such a 
new approach may be styled as being based upon ‘joint governance’.  
 
3. THE VARIANTS OF JOINT GOVERNANCE 
Shachar’s solution to the paradox of multicultural vulnerability takes the form of a 
compromise which she calls ‘joint governance’. Joint governance seeks to overcome the 
problem of ‘artificially compartmentalizing the relationship between the group and the state 
                                                 
79
 The ‘right to exit’ is similar to the application of the ‘specific situation rule’ in cases concerning Article 9 
ECHR. For instance in R (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School 
[2006] UKHL 15, the majority of their Lordships held that there would not be an interference with religious 
freedom where ‘a person has voluntarily accepted an employment or role which does not accommodate that 
practice or observance and there are other means open to the person to practise or observe his or her religion 
without undue hardship or inconvenience’ (para 23).  See Sandberg (n 6) chapter 5. 
80
 Shachar (n 12) 41. 
81
 Shachar (n 12) 12. A similar point is made by Büchler who calls for the ‘(de-)construction of binary 
oppositions’ in the context of determining the family law applicable to an individual on the basis of their 
nationality’: A Büchler , Islamic Law in Europe? (Ashgate 2011) 131.  
82
 Shachar (n 12) 5. For a detailed criticism of how Shachar over-states the arguments of her opponents see S M 
Orkin, ‘Multiculturalism and Feminism: No Simple Question, No Simple Answers’ in Eisenberg and Spinner-
Halev  (n 14) 67.  
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into a fixed inside-outside division [which] conceals the extent to which both are in fact 
interdependent’.83 For Shachar,  
Joint governance promises to foster ongoing interaction between different sources of 
authority, as a means of improving the situation of traditionally vulnerable insiders 
without forcing them to adhere to an either/or choice between their culture and their 
rights.84 
However, Shachar’s account of joint governance is itself based on a paradox. On the one 
hand, she claims that joint governance focuses upon individual agency.  She writes that joint 
governance ‘opens up the possibility that our agency as members of a culture and our agency 
as citizens of a state may be mutually reinforcing, and that cultural accommodation may 
actually enable this mutual reinforcement’.85  Yet, her account of joint governance focuses 
almost entirely on the relationship between the state and the group as two corporate entities.  
Tellingly, she states that joint governance seeks to ‘open up a new separation of powers 
fostering ongoing interactions between different sources of authority’.86 For Shachar, joint 
governance is ‘composed of dialogue between different non-monopolist power centers’.87 
The focus remains on the institutional level rather than on the individual level.88 This means 
that joint governance as understood by Shachar still does not place enough emphasis upon 
agency.  
For Shachar, the ‘model of joint governance describes a repertoire of accommodation 
designs which can be combined and applied in creative ways according to different social 
                                                 
83
 Shachar (n 12) 40. 
84
 Ibid 88. 
85
 Ibid 90. She notes that, ‘Joint governance is based on a “cultural”  understanding of institutions which holds 
that the action and agency of individuals, groups and states is situational, i.e. it varies in different institutions 
settings and to some extent is shaped by them’: ibid 89. 
86
 Ibid 13.  
87
 Ibid 13-14. It is ‘a radically new architecture for dividing and sharing authority in the multicultural state, one 
which encourages a mode of governance composed of dialogue between different non-monopolist power 
centers, rather than an imposition by “all knowing” state or government officials’: ibid 88 . 
88
 As discussed below, this makes Shachar’s schema less achievable. As Phillips notes, ‘In contemporary 
Europe joint governance between the state and religious bodies is not a likely outcome’: Phillips (n 23) 153. 
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needs and arenas’. 89  This section seeks to explore the first four ‘variants’ of joint 
governance, namely federal-style accommodation, temporal accommodation, consensual 
accommodation and contingent accommodation. The next section will then explore the fifth 
variant, transformative accommodation, which has attracted considerably more interest. This 
has been somewhat inevitable given that Shachar presents the first four variants as ‘straw’ 
arguments since she clearly favours and argues for transformative accommodation. This is 
unfortunate because, as she recognises, the fusion of the approaches can be fruitful.  
Moreover, the first four variants are more concrete than transformative accommodation, 
especially if they are not presented in the narrow way in which Shachar seems to present 
them and if more emphasis is given to the agency of the citizen-insiders.  All five variants, 
therefore, deserve a reappraisal in the light of the findings of our empirical research.  
 
A. Federal Style Accommodation  
The first variant of joint governance, federal-style accommodation, occurs ‘where power is 
allocated between several sub-units and among different branches and levels of 
government’.90  This may include nomoi groups alongside other sub-units: such as in the 
Province of Quebec in Canada.  However, federal-style accommodation can only occur where 
there is ‘a territorial division of authority’.  Under this variant, ‘the nomoi group must be 
regionally centred’.91  This would seem to rule out its application in the UK in relation to 
nomoi groups since, although some Christian churches are organised regionally, nomoi 
groups are generally dispersed geographically. However, the development and deepening of 
                                                 
89
 Shachar (n 12) 7. She concedes that  no ‘mere legal formula, or even the best of institution’s designs, can ever 
single-handedly resolve all the immensely complex philosophical problems and near-inexorable moral and 
ethical tensions that arise out of encounters between different cultural communities in shared political spaces’: 
ibid, 7-8.   
90
 Shachar (n 12) 92. 
91
 Ibid 93. 
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political devolution provides evidence of this variant of joint governance and shows a move 
away from centrality with different levels of governance now becoming the norm.92  
 
B. Temporal Accommodation  
The remaining four variants of joint governance are ‘based on jurisdictional rather than 
territorial considerations’ and are therefore more helpful.93  The second variant, temporal 
accommodation, is ‘time bound and issue specific’: it holds that ‘certain life events crucial to 
the continuation of the group’s collective identity (such as the creation of a family or the 
early education of children) should be governed by group tradition as the sole and definitive 
source of authority’ and that ‘outside of these crucial moments, individuals must turn to state 
law’.94  It may be applied, for example, to hold that the early education of children is a matter 
for the nomoi group whilst the later education of children is a matter for the state.  This 
seems, however, to re-introduce the criticised ‘either/or’ approach by simply determining 
when culture trumps citizen rights and vice versa. Although Shachar claims that it ‘avoids the 
“either/or” trap’ in that it recognises a division of authority, ‘neither the state nor the group 
has full and exclusive jurisdiction’,95  this is only true when one looks at the full life of the 
group member. Under the example used earlier, the group would have full and exclusive 
jurisdiction over a small child while the state would similarly have full authority over an 
older child.  Furthermore, this model depends on a precise definition of time- and issue-based 
jurisdictional boundaries between the state and the group’,96 which would be difficult to 
achieve.97 The model also does not seem to recognise the fluid nature of identities. Although 
                                                 
92
 On which see, further, e.g. N Bamforth and P Leyland (eds) Public Law in a Multilayered Constitution 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing 2003).  
93
 Shachar (n 12) 95. 
94
 Ibid 97. 
95
 Ibid 98. 
96
 Ibid 97, fn 21. 
97
 This is the main reason why Shachar concludes that ‘this scheme is problematic’; temporal accommodation is 
‘inherently unstable from an institutional point of view’: ibid 102. 
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Shachar claims that the approach recognises that ‘a group member’s sense of affiliation can 
and will shift across time’,98 this model prescribes when this shift will take place and assumes 
that it is the same for all group members.99  
However, although temporal accommodation suffers from a number of problems, it does 
provide a number of insights into how joint governance can operate.  It reminds us that 
tensions between states and groups ‘typically arise around significant life events’,100 which 
have meanings for both authorities.  This is true for the religious tribunals we studied: as we 
have noted, they were all primarily involved with questions of marital status. The Shariah 
Council and the National Tribunal were concerned predominantly with divorce whilst the 
Beth Din also focused on broader questions of Jewish status.  Further, Shachar notes that 
temporal accommodation schemes ‘must also allow individuals sufficient “inside” knowledge 
of their culture, so that they can ... make a meaningful decision to follow a traditional way of 
life’.101 This suggests that education is part of the answer to the paradox of multicultural 
vulnerability. This means that, although a joint governance system based on temporal 
accommodation may provide a better starting point than one based on territory, it needs to be 
combined with other forms of joint governance and a more fluid understanding of the agency 
of citizen-insiders, which recognises that the timing when the sense of affiliation shifts will 
differ for different people. 
 
C. Consensual Accommodation  
Shachar’s third variant of joint governance, consensual accommodation, functions ‘to permit 
individuals with multiple affiliations to exercise choice and make their own determinations 
                                                 
98
 Ibid 97. 
99
 For a discussion of the nature of identity and the proposal to recognise ‘identity markers’ see Bharma (n 7) 
chapter 8.  
100
 Shachar (n 12) 99. 
101
 Ibid 98. 
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about which legal authority – the state or the group, for example – will have their jurisdiction 
over their personal affairs’.102   This could easily be combined with temporal accommodation. 
Temporal accommodation could dictate when group authority can arise; individuals can then 
choose whether or not to invoke it. 103  This variant has two strengths. First, our empirical 
investigation showed that this is how the religious tribunals themselves understand the way in 
which they function. None of the tribunals we studied has a ‘legal status’ in the sense of 
‘recognition’ by the state. According to one interviewee at the Beth Din:  
People in high places seem to think that we’ve got some sort of official status when 
we’ve got no status whatsoever; it’s consensual for our clients coming here. 
Rather, the Tribunals derive their authority from their religious affiliation, not from the state, 
and that authority extends only to those who choose to submit to them. As one interviewee at 
the Shariah Council commented:  
Obviously some people may not decide to come to the Council thinking we’re divorced 
anyway but others feel that they still have to resolve it in the eyes of God and they come 
[to] the Shariah Council.   
In short, the tribunals operate a voluntary jurisdiction.104 It may, of course, be questioned to 
what extent being of a particular religion is voluntary in than many people are born into a 
religion and community pressure may be a significant factor in keeping people within nomoi 
groups.105  This raises issues concerning how that choice is made and what safeguards need to 
be in place regarding the nature of consent, which, as we will see, are not fully addressed by 
Shachar.  
                                                 
102
 Ibid 103.  
103
 For a critique of this focus upon choice, see, e.g., Ahmed ( n 75) who concludes that ‘the limited legal power 
of individuals to choose the law that applies to then is enough neither to remove other objections to the system 
nor to support the claim that the system enhances personal autonomy’: ibid 239. 
104
 However, in relation to marriage/divorce issues, concerned, they are not ‘arbitrators’.  Their authority to rule 
on the validity/termination of a marriage does not derive from the parties’ agreement to submit their ‘dispute’ to 
them (indeed, there may be no dispute) in the same way as an arbitration clause in a contract (for which the Beth 
Din and some Shariah tribunals would also qualify to rule on civil disputes). See Sandberg (n 6) chapter 9.  
105
 This is the main criticism of the ‘right to exit’ arguments discussed above.  
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 The second strength of this variant is that it seems to place more emphasis upon 
agency. However, oddly, Shachar describes consensual accommodation as requiring a ‘one-
time choice of [which] legal framework will govern the individual’s relevant affairs from 
beginning to the end’.106  She then uses this to attack this variant of joint governance deeming 
it ‘misleading to assume that simply providing a one-time (and forever binding) legal 
opportunity to express consent will overcome the problem of in-group power relations’.107 
This is true but there is no need to define consensual accommodation as requiring a ‘one-time 
choice’.  Given that identities are not fixed but are rather constantly renegotiated, it surely 
follows on from this that people can move between systems of authority.  People may choose 
to be married under the authority of the group but divorced under the authority of the state. 
The ‘one-time choice’ idea is convenient since it avoids the question of how the moving from 
authority to authority is to be facilitated but it also brings us back to an ‘either-or’ 
understanding of religious identity.  The advantage of consensual accommodation is that ‘it 
delegates the decision of which facet of identity to emphasize in a given arena to the 
individual herself’.108  This is lost if that decision is a one-time choice. The ability to change 
one’s mind is fundamental given that ‘freedom of religion protects the subjective belief of an 
individual’.109   
However, the main challenge posed by this variant is determining whether or not there 
has been valid consent.110 As Shachar rightly observes, ‘consensual accommodation must still 
provide an institutional setting that can ensure that vulnerable group members will have the 
                                                 
106
 Shachar (n 12) 103. 
107
 Ibid 107. 
108
 Ibid 104. 
109
 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others, ex parte Williamson [2005] UKHL 15, per 
Lord Nicholls at para 22.   
110
 As Phillips observes, although it is the case that ‘wherever there are groups, there is always the potential for 
coercion’, ‘it is important to recognise the choices people make, not read these as a reflection of their so-called 
culture or treat them as a false consciousness’: Phillips (n 23)  176, 41. 
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resources to choose’.111 In short, the group member must have the capacity to choose. This 
not only requires that there is sufficient information and education; 112 it also requires action 
where the group member is deemed incapable of making that choice because they are too 
young, are under duress or are suffering from a mental illness.  Although this poses difficult 
questions,113 guidance may be derived from the nuanced understanding of consent that has 
already been developed in English criminal law. For instance,114 according to section 74 of 
the Sexual Offences Act 2003, ‘A person consents if he agrees by choice, and has the 
freedom and capacity to make that choice’.  As Phillips points out, there is ‘no answer that 
can catch all instances of coercion’, meaning that ‘we have to go primarily by what people 
say’115 and there need to be measures that make it easier to get their voices (not someone 
else’s) heard’.116  This question of determining whether or not there was consent requires 
cooperation between groups and the state, which may well blossom into a real partnership of 
joint governance including the citizen-insider.117 One way of maximising the chance of 
hearing the voice of the citizen-insider is to require the physical presence of representatives 
from both the state and the nomoi group.  There are existing examples of such cooperation 
occurring: for instance, in the mandatory presence of a registrar at a religious wedding 
ceremony.118   It follows that, although there remains much to be thought through, consensual 
                                                 
111
 Shachar (n 12) 105. 
112
 Ibid 108. See further, Barry (n 36) 239-40. 
113
 As Shachar observes, ‘the issue of consent becomes more complex when we think of children who are too 
young to express their jurisdictional preferences’: Shachar (n 12) 106. 
114
 The law relating to non-fatal and sexual offences provides two further insights. First, English criminal law 
recognises that there are some things to which people cannot legally consent. This is the case in relation to the 
main offences under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 but exceptions to this rule are granted as a matter 
of social policy (see R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75).  Second, the law on sexual offences recognises that there 
are certain situations where it can be presumed that there was no consent (see sections 75 and 76 of the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003). 
115
 Phillips (n 23) 177. 
116
 For Phillips, this would involve practical and specific measures which would remove obstacles, provide 
support services and otherwise assist people in making their personal decisions. See ibid 178.  
117
 This is implicit in Shachar’s insistence that ‘consensual accommodation does not reserve for the group (or 
the state) the ultimate power to determine whether a person is “inside” or “outside” the nomoi community’: 
Shachar (n 12) 107. 
118
 Marriage Act 1949, s 53.  
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accommodation offers a valuable potential step forward, which builds upon temporal 
accommodation.  
 
D. Contingent Accommodation  
Shachar’s fourth variant, contingent accommodation, occurs where: 
The state yields jurisdictional autonomy to nomoi groups in certain well-defined legal 
arenas, but only so long as their exercise of this autonomy meets certain minimal 
state-defined standards. If a group fails to meet these minimal standards, the state may 
intervene in the group’s affairs and override its jurisdiction by applying the state’s 
residual powers.119   
English law already provides some examples of contingent accommodation. This is most 
clearly the case under the Arbitration Act 1996 whereby individuals are free to choose to 
have their civil120 disputes arbitrated by religious personnel which will be recognised and 
enforced by the civil courts unless there is a ‘public policy which requires the court not to’.121   
More generally, as Lord Hope observed in the Supreme Court in R (on the application of E) v 
JFS Governing Body,122  although ‘it has long been understood that it is not the business of 
the courts to intervene in matters of religion’,123  it ‘is just as well understood, however, that 
the divide is crossed when the parties to the dispute have deliberately left the sphere of 
                                                 
119
 Shachar (n 12) 109. 
120
 Under Arbitration Act 1996 s 82, ‘legal proceedings’ means civil proceedings 
121
 Arbitration Act 1996 s1. Kohn v Wagschal and Ors [2007] EWCA Civ 1022 para 18. The Act further lays 
out the general duties of the arbitrator which must be adhered to: See Arbitration Act 1996 s5, 33 and 68. For an 
example of a court declining to uphold an arbitration award, see Soleimany v Soleimany[1999] QB 785. In Jivraj 
v Hashwani [2011] UKSC 40, the Supreme Court confirmed that the law prohibiting discrimination on grounds 
of religion or belief in relation to employment does not apply to the selection, engagement or appointment of 
arbitrators and, if it did, it is likely that the genuine occupational requirement could be relied upon.  
122
 [2009] UKSC 15. 
123
 Para 157. This may be styled the principle of non-justiciability (it has also been referred to as the doctrine of 
judicial abstention and the non-interference principle). See, further, the decisions in Mohinder Singh Kharira v 
Daljit Singh Shergill [2012] EWCA Civ 983, His Holiness Sant Baba Jeet Singh Maharaj v Singh [2010] 
EWHC (QB) 1294 and Blake v Associated Newspapers [2003] EWHC 1960 and, the discussion by Sandberg (n 
6) 74-76. 
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matters spiritual over which the religious body has exclusive jurisdiction and engaged in 
matters that are regulated by the civil courts.’124  
As Shachar correctly observes, the contingent accommodation model ‘may create far 
reaching review powers for the state’.125  However, again she downplays the usefulness of 
this variant. In particular, she takes a pessimistic view stating that ‘this accommodation 
system also requires a complex regulatory regime because information must be gathered 
(presumably by the state authorities)’.126  There is no reason, however, why the regulatory 
regime must be complex.   It could well be the case that a clear demarcation of powers would 
suffice. Our research indicated that all three tribunals were keen to work within the state’s 
legal framework. The general impression given was one of deference towards the state. One 
interviewee at the Beth Din said that they were ‘very sensitive’ and ‘always err on the side of 
caution’ to ensure that they did not apply something which ‘could be seen as tantamount to 
impacting or impeding or obstructing civil law’. Similarly, an interviewee at the Shariah 
Council stressed that:  
We work within the law of the land we cannot go against the law of the land and we 
say that and that actually would be going against Islam as well because we have to 
honour our contracts according to the Islamic teaching. 
This deference was shown in the way in which all three tribunals strongly encourage the 
parties to obtain a civil divorce, if applicable, before they engage in the religious proceedings. 
As an interviewee at the Catholic Tribunal told us: 
In Britain we cannot start, we cannot give an annulment without the people being 
divorced otherwise we’re in trouble with the state, people sometimes forget that we, if 
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we try to dissolve something that the state hadn’t dissolved then we would be in 
trouble.   
 The same view is taken at the Shariah Council:  
 In cases where women are already going through the civil courts and they are sort of 
in the middle of that, if they come to the Shariah Council and they say that they want 
to have the divorce we usually say to them that “once that’s gone ahead”. Because if 
we go ahead and say “you’re divorced”, they’re still married under the legal system, 
which will create a conflict and Islam doesn’t want you to have that conflict of status. 
You know what are going to write?  Are you married or divorced?  So in order to not 
cause any conflict in the person’s own mind and also in terms of the state system its 
best for us to say to them “once that’s resolved then come back to us” 
Moreover, the tribunal staff stated that they advised people to make use of civil law 
mechanisms and remedies. As one of our interviewees at the Beth Din put it: 
We will want to make sure that people have gone through a proper process. ... We will 
try and often send them to professionals.  As far as civil law is concerned we will not 
give any advice, we will tell them that they need a civil divorce and we will often 
point them to a lawyer. 
The Shariah Council stressed how it always advised women to register their marriage under 
state law. This suggests that where there is a clear demarcation of powers then this will be 
adhered to and even promoted by the tribunals. At the moment, the tribunals define their 
competence negatively by refusing to act where the state is competent and by promoting state 
law mechanisms which they are aware of.  The Shariah Council, in particular, were very 
aware that many of the women who come to them were missing out on their rights under state 
law due to a lack of knowledge and understanding. This could be reduced through increased 
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information transfer between the state and nomoi groups. Again, education appears to be the 
key.  
Alternatively, if a more formalised scheme was considered desirable, it is possible to 
conceive of a system based on registration and regular inspections, which could be 
developed. 127   Inspiration for such an endeavour may be found in existing models which are 
already in use. These include several voluntary registration systems which provide certain 
tangible and desirable benefits for registrants,128 as well as the model already in use in 
relation to schools with a religious character where the state continues to ‘intervene’ to ensure 
that certain standards are met,129 even in the case of independent faith schools where state has 
no financial interest in doing so.130   However, before adopting such a model thought needs to 
be given the tendency within certain religious communities not to make use of the registration 
systems that are already provided under English law. Our study seems to suggest that lack of 
education and knowledge is in part responsible for this but there is a need to ensure that the 
advantages accrued by the group and by the citizen-insider by dint of registration are real and 
meaningful, as well as ensuring that these advantages are clearly communicated.   
It is clear that contingent accommodation poses a number of challenges, especially if 
the fluid nature of identity and belonging is to be recognised.  There is a need to negotiate 
and re-negotiate a regulatory partnership between the group and the state.131  Shachar is 
correct to point to ‘the inevitable power asymmetries between the state and the group’.132 As 
                                                 
127
 For a discussion of registration systems pertaining to religious groups which already exist in European States 
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Phillips has argued, it is important that the dialogue is not ‘top-down’.133  This is why the 
focus ought to be on the rights of the citizen-insider. The clear demarcation of powers needs 
to be clearly communicated to the citizen-insider through a three-fold dialogue requiring the 
cooperation of both the state and the nomoi group.  
The main problem with contingent accommodation is that the model focuses on 
methodology not principle. It is not clear what the guiding principle is.  It could well be the 
case that the guiding principle could be derived from the consensual model: it could be that 
‘powers will be allocated between the state and the group in a way which maximizes these 
members’ interests’.134  A similar approach is already found in the Children Act 1989 which 
is based on the guiding principle that the welfare of the child is paramount.135  Such an 
approach would overcome the “minimal standards” problem identified by Shachar, (that is, 
who is allowed to define them and how is one supposed to enforce them in a way consistent 
with the accommodation of deep cultural differences?’ ),136 by ensuring that the standards 
themselves are developed  (and re-developed) through a on-going dialogue between the 
citizen-insiders, other representatives of the group and the state, rather than the state simply 
‘imposing’ the standards found in its law.  This would require the visible cooperation of the 
nomoi group and the state in dialogue with the citizen-insider. An approach that fuses and 
develops Shachar’s second, third and fourth variants would provide a real system of ‘joint’ 
governance which is shared three ways to give both group and state a role to negotiate whilst 
primarily investing power in the citizen-insider. 
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 She notes that despite the obvious advantages of dialogue, in practice it ‘has tended to encourage the 
sedimentation of cultural groups and communities and the selection of specific spokes people (generally male) 
who are then in a position to present their own readings of culture or community as if they were generally 
agreed upon’: Phillips (n 23) 161.  
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 Shachar (n 12) 113. 
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4. TRANSFORMATIVE ACCOMMODATION: A RED HERRING? 
In our analysis, the variants of joint governance already outlined can be fused and developed 
to point to a concrete way forward. However, for Shachar, although all of these variants 
‘represent a distinct evolution in the development of multicultural theory and practice’, their   
‘strategies and solutions, while still provisional, point to the possibility of still another variant 
of joint governance whose success has yet to be tested’. 137 This is her fifth, and favoured, 
variant of joint governance, the frequently cited ‘transformative accommodation’, which she 
suggests represents ‘the most optimistically practical variant of joint governance’.138  Shachar 
writes that this fifth variant is transformative ‘because it is designed to encourage group 
authorities themselves to reduce discriminatory internal restrictions’:139   
Instead of viewing their conflict of interests as a problem, [transformative 
accommodation] considers it as an occasion for encouraging each entity to become 
more responsive to all its constituents.   Through an arrangement of non-exclusive 
competition for the loyalties of those citizens who overlap both jurisdictions, 
transformative accommodation seeks to adapt the power structures of both nomoi 
groups and state in order to accommodate their most vulnerable constituents.140  
On the face of it, this seems to be a general description of joint governance rather than the 
identification of a new variant.141  Moreover, it may be noted that, once again, Shachar’s 
assumptions take a very ‘top-down’ approach, focussing on the group and the state and not 
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 Shachar claims that: ‘This approach aims to enhance the jurisdiction of nomoi groups over matters crucial to 
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in general (once the ‘paradox of multicultural vulnerability’ is recognised)? Ibid 14. 
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the citizen-insider, and this is despite the fact that she critiques other multicultural thinkers 
for doing just that.  
Further, as Phillips points out, ‘Shachar combines a strong sense of the distinctiveness 
and uniqueness of different religio-cultural traditions with a rational actor view of the world’; 
much of Shachar’s exposition of transformative accommodation is ‘written in the language of 
the marketplace’. 142 This is particularly true of Shachar’s fourth assumption upon which 
transformative accommodation is based. She writes that it is assumed that ‘it is in the self-
professed interest of the group and the state to vie for the support of their constituents’. 143  
This suggests that Shachar sees transformative accommodation as a competitive model. 
Indeed, she observes that, ‘each entity must “bid” for these individuals’ continued adherence 
to its sphere of authority’. 144  This reference to competition is unnecessary: consensual 
accommodation should lead to collaboration between the group and the state, not a battle 
between them. Both parties have much to gain, especially given the neo-liberal rolling back 
of the state;145 the operation of nomoi groups can be seen as providing an illustration of David 
Cameron’s ‘big society’ in practice. 
 
A. The Three Core Principles of Transformative Accommodation  
Shachar claims that transformative accommodation is characterised by having ‘three core 
principles’.146  It is questionable, however, whether these core principles actually advance 
matters. Rather, they seem to regurgitate features found in the other variants of joint 
governance often in rather unhelpful ways.  
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 Shachar (n 12) 118.  
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145A point considered in A Shachar. ‘State, Religion and The Family: The New Dilemmas of Multicultural 
Accommodation’ in R Ahdar and N Aroney (eds) Shari’a in the West (Oxford University Press 2010) 115-134. 
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 She writes that: ‘These principles define how authority can be usefully divided, how transformative 
accommodation can maintain the separation of powers, and most importantly, how members of groups can 
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Post-print version of an article published in (2013) 33(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 263-291 
30 
 
The first principle, the ‘sub-matter’ allocation of authority, ‘observes that contested 
social arenas (such as education, family law, criminal justice, immigration, resource 
development, and environmental protection) are internally divisible into “sub-matters”: 
multiple, separable, yet complementary legal components’. 147   Transformative 
accommodation allocates ‘jurisdictional authority upon sub-matter lines’ and this division 
into sub-matters ensures that ‘only when they are addressed [by both state and group] 
together can any legal dispute in a given social arena be resolved.’148  Shachar gives the 
example of family law matters.149  She identifies a distinction between the  ‘demarcating’ 
function, the role of family law in ‘defining and regulating a group’s membership 
boundaries’,150  and the  ‘distributive’ function, ‘which shapes and allocates rights, duties, 
and ultimately powers between men and women within the group’. 151 She notes that divorce 
proceedings generally involve both of these aspects, ‘a change in personal status (the 
demarcating function) and a determination of property relations between the spouses (the 
distributive function)’. 152 Under her schema, the division of these functions between group 
and state means that both are forced into a dialogue. However, our empirical work shows that 
this does not appear to be the case.   It was striking that the religious tribunals we studied are 
mostly exercising a demarcating function.  In all three tribunals, the fundamental rationale for 
the grant of the religious annulment/divorce is to enable the parties to remarry within the 
faith.  The focus is on the marriage itself, not the ancillaries (children, money and 
property).153  The tribunals are ultimately concerned with religious status.  In doing this, they 
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have little contact or dialogue with the state which is responsible for the distributive 
functions. The current implicit and blunt ‘sub-matter’ allocation of authority does not seem to 
provide an incentive for dialogue between group and state.  
Shachar’s second principle, the “no monopoly” rule, draws from the separation of 
powers.154  This rule states that ‘neither the group nor the state can ever acquire exclusive 
control over a contested social arena that affects individuals both as group members and as 
citizens’. 155  It ‘re-defines the relationship between the state and its minority groups by 
structurally positioning them as complementary power-holders’.156 Although this seems to be 
little more than an elucidation of the concept of joint governance as understood above, 
Shachar seems to suggest that this rule would lead to the blurring of jurisdictional boundaries. 
She observes that, ‘Thanks to this interdependent balance, decision-makers in contested 
social arenas can benefit from a broader pool of precedent and autonomy’.157  This would 
seem to be unrealistic and undesirable given that the laws of the state and nomoi groups have 
different focuses.158  The religious tribunals in our study were all aware that they did not 
exercise a legal monopoly. As we have noted above, the limits to their jurisdiction were 
shaped by their understandings of state law and the overriding impression given was one of 
                                                                                                                                                        
evidence submitted by the applicant and in light of any conflicting evidence from other spouse.  In contrast, for 
the Beth Din, no grounds need be proved, and there is no ‘ruling’ or judgment that the marriage has broken 
down. Its role is supervisory:  to ensure the parties divorce each other correctly and that the get document itself 
is properly drawn up.  In terms of its divorce jurisdiction, the National Tribunal’s role is inquisitorial:  the 
Tribunal must satisfy itself that there are grounds to annul the marriage.  In essence, the Tribunal is concerned 
with whether there was a true consent between the parties at the time of the marriage. See, further, G Douglas et 
al (n1 and n 15). 
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deference. Moreover, the interviewees were keen to stress the religious nature of their work. 
As one interviewee at the Catholic Tribunal put it, ‘the whole process is pastoral’.159  
The third principle, ‘the establishment of clearly delineated choice options’, refers to 
the need to establish ‘clearly delineated choice options through which constituents can 
express approval or disapproval of state or group decisions’.160 This seems to amount to little 
more than the notion of consensual accommodation as developed above (rejecting Shachar’s 
insistence that consent is a one off choice).161  However, rather than focusing on the nature  
of consent, Shachar focuses upon when people can choose to move from group to state (or 
vice versa).  She writes that ‘such participation must proceed on an issue-by-issue basis, once 
the initial jurisdictional boundaries have been set, thus allowing nomoi members to 
meaningfully choose between jurisdictions’.162 However, these ‘reversal provisions’ are not 
to be taken lightly: 
The purpose is not to fracture group solidarity so that members can opt out at the 
slightest opportunity. The initial division of authority between group and state must 
remain meaningful and presumptively binding on its individual.163 
This would seem to amount to a presumption that people should remain subject to the 
authority which they originally found themselves in.  Moreover, Shachar seems to be saying 
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that these clear reversal points would become fixed. 164  Shachar uncharacteristically assumes 
a static understanding of the interaction between groups and the state and assumes that the 
citizen-insider is unable to fend for themselves.165  This is inconsistent with the acceptance of 
the fluid nature of identities and could well exacerbate the ‘paradox of multicultural 
vulnerability’. At the very least, it is difficult to see how this proposal advances matters.  
 
B. Five Problems with Transformative Accommodation  
In short, we contend that a fusion of the earlier variants of joint governance may provide a 
preferable solution to the paradox of multicultural vulnerability than the much cited variant of 
transformative accommodation. However, that is not to say Shachar’s elucidation of 
transformative accommodation does not provide any further insights which can be added to 
those developed from the earlier variants of joint governance.  Many of the innovations 
which she attributes to transformative accommodation can already be found in embryonic 
form in the other variants. Moreover, there are many specific points which are not 
contentious.  For instance, she writes that there is a need for members to be ‘granted at least 
minimal (education or material) resources through the state’s exercise of authority in its 
designated sub-matter’.166  We agree. This seems to be a rare recognition on Shachar’s part 
that it cannot be assumed that the state and the group have the same responsibilities and roles. 
It is only right that it would be the role of the state to ensure that information is available.  
However, generally, it seems that the mention of transformative accommodation confuses 
rather than aids the debate.  Our empirical work points to five further problems with the 
account given by Shachar.  
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First, Shachar’s account presumes that the dialogue and choice is simply between the 
group and the state. In addition to overlooking the fact that neither the group nor the state is a 
homogeneous entity, this ignores how having multiple affiliations means that people are often 
members of more than one group. There are often groups within larger groups. And 
movement between these groups is possible. This was shown clearly in the phenomenon of 
‘forum shopping’ we observed in the religious tribunals we studied. The absence of an appeal 
hierarchy in the Muslim and Jewish communities means that litigants can, to some extent, 
choose which tribunal they go to according to the way in which (they think) the law will be 
applied to them and can then make use of a different religious tribunal if they are not satisfied 
the first time.167   This means that Shachar’s implicit assumption that there is only one group 
in play at one time is misguided.  
Second, Shachar’s account assumes the presence of conflict between the group and 
the state and employs a too legalistic understanding of authority. She writes that  
‘transformative accommodation shares with federal-style accommodation the assumption that 
although group leaders may want to hold complete power over all group members, they can 
be convinced of the practical advantages of compromise when faced with the alternative of 
receiving no public legal authority at all’.168  This would seem to be a false assumption. The 
informants at the religious tribunals in our study did not seem to want to hold ‘complete 
power’ and they also did not seem to mind whether they had any ‘public legal authority’.  
Moreover, the authority which group leaders enjoy is not purely ‘legal’; rather it seemed to 
derive from a combination of their position in the court, their standing in the community and 
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their own personality.169  The majority of these people are also religious leaders and their 
‘legal’ functions are just one part of their much larger pastoral role.  This is shown by the 
work of the Dayanim at the Beth Din who spend a significant amount of time answering 
questions by Rabbis and lay people relating to matters concerning daily ritual and practice. 
As one interviewee commented: 
First and foremost [the Dayanim] are a resource both for Rabbis in our synagogues 
who aren’t as learned as they are and for laymen to come straight to them and ask 
them questions and this happens day and night. I mean they are literally on the phone 
the whole time. 
Third, the idealistic world of transformative accommodation is a world without boundaries.  
Shachar asserts that it ‘refrains from enforcing externally imposed norms on the group’.170  It 
is questionable, however, whether this could or should always be the case. Surely the state 
would and should be obligated to impose its norms where a group’s nomos required (say) 
human sacrifice?  For Shachar, it is the lack of imposed minimal standards that distinguishes 
transformative accommodation from contingent accommodation.171  However, without 
explicit ‘minimal standards’ to guide interactions between the state and the group, implicit 
ideas about minimal standards will form anyway but would be hidden and opaque.  Minimal 
standards are required. The crucial point is that the establishment and re-establishment of 
these  minimal standards requires the visible dialogue between nomoi groups, the state and 
citizen-insiders.  
Fourth, Shachar’s scheme is often aimed at achieving integration rather than 
accommodation.172   She talks, for instance, of ‘reaching a resolution [which] means 
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appealing to, and integrating, the operation of two value systems - that of the state and the 
nomoi group’. 173 Shachar seems to think that if the right conditions were created then the 
group will reform itself and will accept the prevailing norms of the state.174  This is wishful 
thinking.  It assumes that such prevailing norms exist and that all discriminatory behaviour is 
equally bad.  This is not the case.  This can be shown, for instance, in the entrenched and 
complex differences which continue to exist in relation to discrimination on grounds of sex 
and sexual orientation. As the presence of religious exceptions in the Equality Act 2010 
signifies,175 the position of religious groups on these matters is often different to society as a 
whole and the pace of societal change is faster than that within certain groups.  It would be 
wishful thinking to assume that these differences will simply disappear over time.176  The 
situation is more nuanced than Shachar’s account assumes.  
Fifth, as Shachar concedes, ‘transformative accommodation is admittedly limited in 
terms of immediate and practical judicial economy’.177  This is shown, for example, in the 
way in which Shachar makes significant demands of the state.   She reasons that ‘since the 
state is the most powerful entity, the presumption in the negotiations must be in favor of the 
group’.178  This means that ‘generosity at the negotiation stage is required from the state as 
                                                                                                                                                        
on integration implies a intention to achieve over time a degree of assimilation whereby differences are reduced. 
In contrast, the focus on accommodation assumes no such intention. The end goal of accommodation is simply 
the making of space for such difference to exist within the majority culture.   
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the stronger party’. 179   For Shachar, the appeal of transformative accommodation is that it 
‘offers major advantages of a more lasting import’.180  However, this means that it is unlikely 
to have much political appeal given short-term thinking and the low level at which the debate 
occurs in the media and in public life.181 More so than the other varieties of joint governance 
Shachar identifies, transformative accommodation is vague and unrealistic.182  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
Our empirical findings suggest that Shachar’s Multicultural Jurisdictions allows us to make a 
number of important steps forward.  As Phillips rightly observed, Shachar’s starting point is 
compelling: it should be possible to refuse the choice between culture and rights and ‘it ought 
to be possible to recognise that some individuals are coerced by cultural and religious 
pressures without concluding that all individuals are’.183 Shachar is correct to reject the easy 
‘either/or’ approaches, ‘opening the door to newer, more complex, and more attractive state – 
and group-based possibilities’.184 The notion of joint governance recognises how ‘nomoi 
communities are living entities’ which ‘have ample resources for re-interpretations which 
permit them to preserve their nomos while adaptively responding to change’.185  
However, whilst Shachar follows a host of other scholars in recognising the fluid 
nature of identities that co-exist, interact and mutate,186  the variants of joint governance she 
proposes fail to pay sufficient attention to the agency of the citizen-insider. Indeed, Shachar’s 
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much-lauded concept of transformative accommodation is ironically one of the least useful of 
the variants of joint governance which she identifies. Although its intentions are mostly 
laudable, the concept is vague and idealistic.187  We suggest that a fusion of three of the other 
variants of joint governance (excluding federal-style accommodation), if understood in a 
broader way which gives greater emphasis to agency, may point to a clearer way forward.  
The temporal and consensual accommodation models provide for a system which allows 
groups to have authority at certain times and then permits the citizen-insider to choose when 
to come under that authority.  The consensual accommodation model also underscores the 
importance of the question of consent.  There is a need to ensure that choice is free and 
informed and, if we reject Shachar’s insistence that consent is a ‘one-time choice’, then there 
is a need to ensure that people can move from system to system. This could all be facilitated 
using insights derived from the contingent model of accommodation whereby recognition is 
given by the state subject to an oversight function underpinned by a guiding principle. There 
is a need for visible cooperation between the nomoi group and the state in dialogue with the 
citizen-insider. This could lead to the negotiation and re-negotiation of minimal standards 
which could possibly be maintained by means of a system of registration and inspection 
developed through a dialogue between the state, the group and citizen-insiders. This could be 
enhanced by a central guiding principle that the welfare of the group insider is paramount.188   
As Shachar concedes, ‘joint governance does not provide a perfect solution to the 
multiculturalism paradox’. Rather, as she states, its main contribution ‘is to take into 
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consideration the interests of all three participants in the multicultural triad’.189  However, our 
re-examination of Shachar’s proposals in light of our empirical findings suggests that this 
focus leads her to make two main mistakes. The first is her emphasis upon the group in the 
singular. As the phenomenon of forum shopping shows, religious groups are not 
homogeneous entities. The choice for the citizen-insider is not simply between group or state, 
it is between different variants of the group (and indeed different manifestations of the state). 
The second mistake is that all her variants of joint governance take an institutional approach 
which focuses upon the interaction of state and group. The citizen-insider is simply the one 
over whom the group and state fight. The needs, motives and feelings of the citizen-insider 
are absent from the analysis.  This means that Shachar’s variants of joint governance 
ultimately fail to fulfil the main function she describes: she writes that ‘joint governance 
allows individuals the opportunity to self-select their jurisdictions’.190 We have set out above 
how a re-working and combining of her variant models can provide a potential solution 
which more closely achieves the goal. After all, Shachar’s insight is by no means new.191  It 
is actually a return to something that has been lost. The English legal system has long 
accepted and administered different forms and sources of law.192  There is no reason why this 
cannot be achieved in the twenty-first century.  
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